How to use drones effectively— the Bayraktar TB-2
07. March 2022
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 triggered a global outcry against President Vladimir Putin’s actions. It is the next stage of escalation in a conflict whose active phase began with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. What is taking place there now can only be described with one word: War — in Europe, 1000 km away from Berlin.
The military situation is difficult to assess and constantly in flux. What seems clear is this: Whatever Putin has planned has been thwarted by Ukrainian resistance. The world has been given an almost unbelievable sight: The might of the Russian forces, long seen as the primary adversary and a worthy opponent of the combined NATO forces struggle in their invasion of the Ukraine, a country that, even though their military was propped up at incredible speed over the past years, was not really on the global power radar. At the same time, the mood among the Russian troops seems unenthusiastic, with increasing reports of desertions, for example.
In this article, I would like to shed light on the use of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs), specifically the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2, on the Ukrainian side. This has already played a role in two previous articles: The Armenia-Azerbaijan War 2020, where it played a crucial role on the Azerbaijani side, and in my analysis of the Ukraine conflict of 2014–2021 with regard to drones.
The conclusion there was that this drone could play a decisive role on the Ukrainian side, an opinion apparently shared by Ukrainian procurement. So how is the TB-2 doing in this conflict? Does it have a decisive impact?
Empfehlungen
The value of using drones cannot be ignored in modern warfare: They serve as force multipliers, cheap but effective weapons platforms and elements of psychological warfare. Modern drones, such as the TB-2, are difficult to attack from previously available weapons platforms — they are too slow for aircraft, too small for air defence and too difficult to detect for MANPADs and small arms.
This makes the Bayraktar TB-2, like other drones in its class, incredibly potent weapons platforms. The current conflict in Ukraine proves that even the Russian military machine, which has a reputation for very effective air defence, does not seem to have an absolute answer to drone defence.
The success of the TB-2 in various conflicts is of course a testament to this drone. However, it should be borne in mind that they are mainly used because Turkey is one of the few countries that exports its drone without major restrictions. It seems reasonable to assume that the successes are not directly linked to the TB-2 but to the use of drones themselves.
Our recommendations therefore are:
- Ukraine must continue to be supported with drones. Drones are an effective multiplier for other forces. Their use in the conflict analysed here is probably not decisive for the war due to their limited numbers, but nevertheless obviously significant — every BUK system taken out means greater freedom of movement for other Ukrainian aircraft, every convoy taken out means less pressure on the front.
- Ukraine has started developing and deploying its own drones based on its long experience in Crimea and they seem to be effective, even though this article has focused on the TB-2. Any Western military should pay attention to what is happening there, learn without prejudice and move to development and procurement as soon as possible.
- Specialised equipment for drone defence and, in the alternative, electronic warfare is needed as soon as possible, not only for fixed bases but also for convoys and even at platoon level. Due to the frequent operational and technical innovations in drones, drone defence systems need to be constantly modernised and tested and their use trained — the next adversary will have drones on his side.
Drone arms race and analysis of effectiveness
Ukraine has received a total of 18 Bayraktar TB-2 systems by early 2022. On 02 March 2022, Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov announced that the country would receive Stinger and Javelin missiles from various Western countries, as well as a second shipment of Turkish drones. Based on my earlier article and all available reports, it is safe to assume that the drones are Bayraktar TB-2s. One thing is clear: Ukraine would not buy any more of these weapons in the midst of war if they were not effective in the current conflict.
Since the beginning of the invasion, the Bayraktar has acquired a reputation that could almost be described as cult status. Already in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, a non-negligible effect was the psychological one: Armenian soldiers had the feeling that they could be surprised by a drone attack anytime and anywhere. This, together with the first measurable successes described below, has even led to the composition of a Ukrainian hymn to the Bayraktar:
The blog Oryx, internationally recognised for its conflict analyses, has analysed videos of the TB-2 released so far by the Ukrainian military. It has compiled a list of targets on the Russian side that were demonstrably destroyed in the first week of the war:
- 1 Infantry Fighting Vehicle
- 5 howitzers
- 5 air defence systems (SAM — Surface to Air Missile system)
- 1 communication station
- 2 fuel-laden trains
- 20 trucks and other vehicles
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment for which photographic or video evidence is available. Overall, very little footage of TB-2 attacks over Ukraine has been published, and only insofar as it is valuable from a propaganda perspective. Therefore, the number of pieces of equipment damaged by TB-2 is probably far greater than indicated below.
This means that the TB-2 has scored 34 confirmed hits and, at a unit cost of about $2 million per system, has already destroyed several times its own cost in enemy equipment.
One example: The SAM systems destroyed in the video released on 27 February is estimated to cost $50 million. UCAVs of this size cannot be compared to fighter aircraft, tanks or artillery in terms of their operational spectrum and tactical objectives. Nevertheless, one thing is clear — their use:
- Unlike these, does not require Ukrainian soldiers to risk their lives at the front,
- Requires lower investment in case of doubt; a German Leopard 2 battle tank costs 15 million euros, a fourth-generation fighter, which is no longer current, cannot be obtained for less than 20 million USD
- Is possible with several crews continuously and without withdrawal from the front,
- And has a much lower running cost and cost per mission than conventional aircraft.
If a $2 million weapon destroys a $50 million weapon, any government can be satisfied.
Technical details of the Bayraktar TB-2
Baykar Defence, a Turkish company, manufactures the Bayraktar TB-2 mainly for the Turkish armed forces; however, it has become an export hit in recent years and in addition to Turkey and Ukraine, it is also used by Qatar, Azerbaijan and also Ethiopia, albeit covertly there. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, the Kremlin is trying to stop the increasing influx of weapons and military aid from the country’s international partners, especially from Europe, by deploying heavy bombers over the logistics routes.
The Bayraktar TB-2 is an Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle capable of Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) flight operations. It is furthermore capable of semi-autonomous decision-making, which may mean, for example, engaging certain types of detected vehicles (see also, for example, BLU-108 Submunitions to illustrate that this is not a feature from science fiction).
Selçuk Bayraktar, an MIT alumnus, is largely responsible for the UAV’s development. While the Turkish Armed Forces define the TB-2 as a “tactical UAV” to distinguish it from the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) Anka UAV, it is classified as a MALE UAV according to international standards.
Each TB-2 system is said to include six aircraft, two ground control stations, three ground terminals (GDT), two remotely operated video terminals (RVT) and various ground support equipment. The flight systems are monitored and controlled from the ground control station, requiring a total of three people: a pilot, the payload operator and a mission commander.
The cross-redundant architecture of the ground control system allows the pilot, payload operator and mission commander to each command, control and monitor the platform even if one of the control stations fails.
By 26 November 2021, the TB-2 drone had completed 400,000 flight hours. According to analyst Salem Al Ketbi, the increased demand for the drone type contributed to Turkey’s growing “strategic influence” — something that could change the previously US-dominated fabric of the region.
This is the second time that Bayraktar drones have been used in a major offensive; I reported on their use in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in an article last year.
Particularly noteworthy is the effectiveness of the system also in the presence of and against air defence. Specifically, Russian forces in Syria found that modern Pantsir-S1 systems were ineffective, as were older Osa and Strela systems in Nagorno-Karabakh.
So far, it is not possible to conclusively assess the reasons for this effectiveness. Presumably, however, it is a combination of the size and flight altitude of the drones that means that acquisition and fire control radar designed for conventional aircraft cannot provide good target acquisition and anti-aircraft missiles do not hit their target properly.
Operational analysis
In order to better understand the Ukrainian TB-2 drone operations, we should take a closer look at some specific operations. It is clear that the source situation does not allow for an objective analysis of a conflict that is still ongoing. Nevertheless, looking at different material, together with the TB-2’s earlier missions, provides a first assessment of its effectiveness.
Attacking a ground-to-air defence system during redeployment
A video shared on Facebook by Valery Zaluzhny, commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, shows an attack by a TB-2 on a Russian surface-to-air system inside a convoy. On his Facebook page, Zaluzhny posted “Bayraktars at work”, referring to two separate videos. The official description is that the operation took place near Malryn, about 60 miles northwest of Kiev.
A row of missile-laden and other vehicles can be seen in a false-colour thermal view. The crosshairs are over the front missile vehicle, which is also closest to the centre of the convoy. Next to the vehicle in front of the targeted missile vehicle is another vehicle that appears to be being repaired by a third vehicle parked next to it in the middle of the road.
In this particular video, we know from Zaluzhny’s confirmation that the drone used was a Bayraktar TB-2. The destroyed system belonged to the BUK family of SAMs. The video shows only one hit, but that does not mean that there were not more hits.
The fact that the descriptions of the video talk about the destruction of the convoy could be an indication that there were further impacts or secondary explosions after the explosion of the first vehicle. The aftermath of the explosion cannot be seen because it is obscured by fire and smoke.
Analysis
The video shows people slowly moving between two SAMs. The drone was also not fired upon with small arms, a tactic recommended by Armenia in the final phase of the conflict. Together, this means that despite the low altitude, the drone was probably not noticed.
It is not possible to tell whether the missile hitting the SAM systems was also fired by the observing drone; in fact, even careful analysis of the video does not reveal any missile in the footage, which is not unusual given the low frame rate and high speed of such missiles. It is therefore also impossible to say whether the missile was fired by the observing drone, or by a drone at all.
Attack on a Russian column near Chornobayvka
On 27 February, the Ukrainian army posted a video on Facebook showing a missile fired from a TB-2 hitting a larger Russian military column.
On the video we don’t see a target, but a white spot on the middle vehicle. Comparison with other videos suggests that this is a laser designator that directs a bomb into the target; possibly the HUD is turned off when this feature is used to give pilots better visuals and control. Shortly afterwards there is an explosion. There is at least one more secondary explosion. The explosion site is burning bright-hot, and based on the burn marks emanating from the impact site, it is possible that the target could have been a convoy of tankers.
The date of this mission shows that Ukraine was able to carry out air strikes four days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Again, it can be established that the target was Russian and that the weapon used was a Bayraktar UAS.
Analysis
The drone was apparently able to approach, target and make an effectiveness assessment after deployment without hindrance. There are no evasive manoeuvres or the like to indicate that the drone was under fire; the image quality is also good and the video link is stable — so electronic warfare measures were either not active or ineffective.
In the past, such an attack on a convoy was only possible in the context of a covert raid, seldom carried out in the open. To protect such a convoi, conventional air strikes should be countered with mobile or man-based air defence; other attacks with heavy equipment or perimeter cover after dismounting. The fact that a drone could move more or less unhindered against the convoy is the nightmare of every logistician.
Attack on an entrenched and active air defence system
Ukraine has also released a video of an attack outside Kiev in which a Russian Buk surface-to-air missile system was destroyed. The attack was carried out by a Bayraktar drone, according to the army; the video shows the familiar informational overlay of the TB-2.
In the video, at least two SAM vehicles can be seen parked between sparse trees. It is a BUK SAM system, as in the first video. Unlike there, however, the vehicles are obviously entrenched and ready for combat. Five vehicles can be seen — in the centre a TELAR (Transporter Erector Launcher Radar, the fire control radar is included in the BUK launcher) and a logistics vehicle which is mainly required for reloading. Furthermore, you can see what is probably the command vehicle and the search radar of the BUK at the top edge of the video; together these vehicles form a complete system. The target coordinates shown in the video point to a forest outside Kiev.
The vehicle on the right is hit by a missile with an obviously smaller warhead. The explosion is not very noticeable at first, but shortly afterwards the recording shows a much larger secondary explosion. As the video progresses, there are renewed secondary explosions. After the initial detonation, there is a considerable amount of smoke covering the area before the video ends.
Analysis
From the video we can see that it is a direct hit into the TELAR vehicle. It is questionable why the explosion is significantly smaller than those shown above. It is possible that it is a missile with a smaller warhead; the secondary explosions will probably have led to a total failure of the BUK system.
What is special about this video is that the system appears to be fully operational. Although designed to counter aircraft, its designers probably did not anticipate the increasing miniaturisation and the move towards unmanned aerial vehicles, which in this case led to its complete destruction.
Conclusions
The Bayraktar TB-2s are apparently still operational, although the full range of state-of-the-art air defence and electronic warfare equipment was transferred to Ukraine as part of the Russian invasion. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe OSCE, whose drone missions have been constantly hampered, has already had to contend with the latter in its mission of monitoring the ongoing conflicts in the Donbass — but they apparently have no large-scale impact on the deployment of the TB-2s.
The drones are not only used to attack stationary targets, with SAM systems and supply convoys as primary targets. As in previous conflicts, it has become apparent that drones seem to be able to operate more or less unhindered on the battlefield. This could be due to several factors, some of which I would like to highlight:
First, the defence equipment deployed by Russia is not designed to counter drones. This is an important point: drones, even those of TB-2 size, are very different from conventional aircraft, in altitude, size and speed. The design of conventional air defence does not seem to favour good engagement of such targets.
In addition, the TB-2’s radar cross-section is, according to computer analysis, mainly upward-facing, which is an optimisation (conscious or unconscious) for avoiding detection by ground radar systems. It also indicates that it would probably be best detected by L-band radar. Stealth features have until recently been reserved for expensive, latest-generation military equipment; that seems to be changing.
However, it remains unclear why electronic warfare equipment seems to be ineffective against drones. As described above, the OSCE has had massive problems with it. If the drone is not resistant to measures such as targeted jamming of GPS signals and radio frequencies or broadband jamming, then the Russian side does not seem to have deployed enough such equipment to be able to prevent drone flights in the area.
Lastly, it should be emphasised that the Ukrainian army seems to be taking classic guerrilla measures into the air. In a large-scale invasion such as that carried out by Russia, it is simply impossible in today’s times to protect all advancing units against all kinds of attacks. This gives Ukraine massive advantages not only in terms of drones.
The Bayraktar TB-2 is undoubtedly one of the most advanced weapons systems used by the Ukrainian armed forces. It is not clear whether the drones are being used on the basis of intelligence or whether they are using their 27-hour layover to conduct reconnaissance and then attack targets on occasion. It is reasonable to assume that they are intelligence-led.
Details on how they find their targets will understandably not be released due to current and future operational security concerns. However, the experience from Nagorno-Karabakh shows that the TB-2’s strength lies in its interaction with other forces as a force multiplier. The decisive factor there was not the most futuristic drone — it was the drone technology itself and its creative use at all levels of the conflict. This insight is probably also applicable to the current war.